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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an overview of the initial Orbiter handling qualities requirements, their ef-
fect on the vehicle design, and how it all turned out through the first six orbital missions. Follow-
ing this, there is a series of more detailed discussions of some specific areas consisting of hand
controller considerations and the wheelie problem. Finally, there is a discussion which reviews the
requirements for the pitch axis subsonic flight control system and provides some results of recent
simulator evaluations to compare the existing system at landing with several other configurations.
THE REQUIREMENTS
The original handling qualities requirements for the Space Shuttle were written more than 10
years ago. At the time, the magnitude of the task seemed overwhelming considering the size of the
flight envelope the variety of control devices, control modes and control tasks. The existing MIL
Spec. and user's guide run about 800 pages. This provides the requirements for conventional aero-
dynamic vehicles which correspond to a small part of the Shuttle mission/flight control matrix.
Table 1 attempts to illustrate this. From a flight envelope viewpoint, most conventional aircraft ex-
perience lies in the lower right corner of the entry/ aerosurface control element in table 1. What
were we to do with the rest of it? As a starting point, the Space Shuttle Flying Qualities Symposium
was held at what was then the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas in January 1971. 1 This was
organized by Donald C. Cheatham (NASA, retired) to solicit industry-wide opinion on the subject. It
was well attended by a cross-section of the guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) community. The
coverage, however, turned out to be limited to aerodynamic control of entry through landing. While
most of the problem areas were recognized and discussed and systems concepts were presented, little
design criteria was proposed except in the approach and landing area. In fact, one of the partici-
pants proposed that definitive criteria were not needed. Supposedly, the contractors knew what was
good and bad. The simple statement "make it good" was the only requirement needed--an interesting
concept. However, the flight control system designers said they needed some response criteria be-
cause of the closed-loop, fly-by-wire control concept and the unconventional airframe characteristics.
After about six months of debate, all relevant information on handling qualities for the whole Shuttle
mission were incorporated into 30 pages of text.
The basic reason for the relatively abbreviated set of requirements was that it was not intended
to be a generally applicable specification for manned spacecraft or define the total boundary of ac-
ceptable conditions and the ultimate limits between acceptable and unacceptable. Instead, it was in-
tended to present conditions that were thought to be easily achievable and fall well within the ac-
ceptable boundaries for a specific vehicle and mission concept. No theoretical rationale was pro-
vided. The requirements were based on simulations of the vehicle and mission as known at the time.
One underlying assumption was that there would always be active, closed-loop control of vehicle re-
sponse parameters with sufficient control power and parameter adjustment capability to get any type
of response desired. In most cases, all that was specified was the control power or maneuver rate,
the control modes, and a transient response envelope. The response requirement format chosen allowed
the requirements for the whole mission to be specified on two pages. It was all quite arbitrary.
However it represented something that worked on the existing simulators and was consistent with
Apollo experience where it was considered applicable.
The remote manipulator system is shown as a control effector used during onorbit payload opera-
tions. This was not addressed in the original requirements, as it is in a slightly different class.
Because of the flexibility of the arm, the limited force, and variable geometry and inertia it is
not a trivial matter. It is a valid man-in-the-loop handling qualities consideration for payload
operations, especially heavy payloads. Handling qualities had no significant influence on the de-
sign other than control mode and controller configuration. The task now is to accommodate the result.
To provide Shuttle-type vehicles with conventional handling qualities requirements during as-
cent, onorbit, and early entry is a very big job remaining to be done. One might debate whether it
really needs doing. The need to compromise with the ideal handling qualities requirements will be
much greater for this type of vehicle because of the potential costly impact on vehicle configuration
and consumables. As a result, the need to define the minimum acceptable side of the requirement is
probably where the real urgency lies.
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TABLE I
Mission phase
Control	 effectors Launch and Abort Onorbit Entry
SRB/M.E.	 - TVC First stage ascent ------ ---- --
Attitude control
Fly commands
M.E.	 TVC Guided ascent and ------ ---- --
Abort - fly the
Commands
RTLS, TAL, ADA, ATO
OMS TVC Orbit	 insertion AV Orbit maneuver AV ---- --
Rendezvous
Fly commands Deorbit
RCS Single engine OMS Attitude control q < 2 PSF
Roll	 control Stationkeep
Fly commands Prox OPS Fly commands
Payload OPS
Single engine OMS
Roll	 control
RCS/AERO ----- ------ q = 2 PSF + M = 1
Fly commands
Aero Surfaces Trim for load relief ----- M < 1
Fly commands
	
OTW
RMS ----- Payload OPS -----
RESULTS
After five approach and landing test flights and six orbital missions, a major result is that
the only significant handling quality concerns have been in that little area where we have vast expe-
rience--the landing maneuver--specifically, the final flare to touchdown and the derotation to lower
the nose gear. In reviewing this ironic turn of events, it appears that the reason is that in de-
signing a vehicle that performs well in all the other mission phases where we have less experience,
we have so changed the inherent vehicle characteristics, the flight control system and the flight
path that it is no longer representative of the experience we do have. Efforts to make it more con-
ventional for landing failed due to the penalties in weight, performance, and complexity imposed on
some other part of the mission. The factors we were driven to accept were the following:
1. Unpowered approach and landing	 5. Lack canard control surfaces
2. Lack of static stability	 6. High landing speed
3. Elevon controls	 7. Massive redundancy
4. Lack of direct lift control	 8. Digital flight control
These factors either by themselves or combined affect the handling qualities during approach and
landing. The last two contribute to additional time delays in the flight control system.
138
From an overall standpoint, handling qualities did not have much effect in determining the con-
figuration of a really new first-generation vehicle, such as the Orbiter. Some of the reasons for
this are the following:
1. In a radically new first-generation vehicle, the uncertainties in performance and survival
far overshadow the vagaries of handling qualities requirements. In terms of urgency, compromises are
not likely to be made in favor of handling qualities. In a second-generation vehicle, the result
might be quite different since both handling qualities and performance capability would be better un-
derstood.
2. With the advent of fly-by-wire and digital flight control, there is a tendency to assume
that any handling qualities problem can be solved with software. There is probably even a lot of
truth in that but it does not follow that we are instantly smart enough to know how to do it. We
still have a lot to learn about the fine points of fly-by-wire, closed-loop control of statically un-
stable aircraft in situations where precise control relative to another near object (a vehicle or the
ground) is concerned. Even with a more favorable vehicle configuration, it would be easy to end up
with poor handling qualities due to the way the control loops are designed. There are a lot more
choices but we do not understand the additional set of limitations that go with them. There are more
ways to go wrong. The trend in vehicle design, however, seems clearly to optimize for performance
and depend more on fully active computer dependent flight control systems to make up the deficien-
cies. The Orbiter took a giant step in that direction.
3. These are interesting and challenging problems--the kind that engineers like to work on.
Sometimes we are too willing to accept the challenge rather than argue for the tried and true. So,
in a sense, we tend to invite trouble.
4. Finally, there is the fallback argument that if handling qualities become too much of a prob-
lem, the auto mode is always available. However, the auto mode must be given equal priority in the
design process as it was in the Shuttle. Each control mode has its unique problems. For a really
new vehicle, providing both greatly improves the likelihood that at least one will always be avail-
able.
The reason there have not been more problems in other mission phases might be that so far they
have not really been exercised in situations that are critical from a handling qualities standpoint.
All launches have been in automatic control with no launch aborts. We have not done any rendezvous,
stationkeeping, or docking yet. It is the operation in close proximity to another object that tends
to stress the handling qualities. For the most part, however, onorbit operations are not time criti-
cal and proceed very slowly. Some can even accommodate repeated attempts; e.g., docking. So there
really is no reason for concern at this time.
During most of entry, maneuver rates are very low. Most have been flown in the auto mode. How-
ever, enough has been done to indicate the pilot has adequate control to perform the required bank re-
versals manually and has done some pushover/pull-up maneuvers to gather aero data. The significant
issue here appears to be RCS propellant consumption not handling qualities. The auto system tends to
use less. The anomalies that did occur are the result of variations in the aero data from that used
to design the system and affects both auto and manual modes.
Subsonically, the pilot appears to have no problem flying the vehicle manually to perform the
heading alignment maneuvers, the steep approach and preflare. From there to touchdown, it appears
necessary to exercise unusual care to avoid large control inputs which tend to produce pilot-induced
oscillation (PIO) in the pitch axis. More about that later. One other exception is the effect of
winds aloft. Since the Orbiter is unpowered, its trajectory and energy management can be greatly
affected. In three of the first six missions, there have been winds outside of the environmental de-
sign specification. Some last-minute modifications to the approach trajectory were required. There
has been a continuing effort to develop ways to make the system able to accommodate a wider range of
wind conditions.
SOME PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS
Several other topics warrant some further discussion with respect to handling qualities. These
are hand controller configuration, the derotation control problem or "wheelie", and the pitch axis
flight control system tendency toward pilot induced oscillation at landing. This section will ad-
dress each of these.
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HAND CONTROLLER CONCERNS
The Orbiter uses the same Apollo-type hand controller for both aero control and onorbit reaction
control system (RCS) attitude control. The latter is essentially an on/off control function. Ide-
ally it should have a different type of feel than that required for good aero control. We optimized
as much as possible for good aero control and accepted the result for RCS control. As a result, it
is impossible to tell by the feel force exactly when the jets fired. Consequently, there is a ten-
dency to make sure the control input is big enough. There has been some concern, but this is appar-
ently acceptable, although some of the more demanding tasks like docking have not been done yet. The
alternative is more mechanical complexity, such as having two controllers or adjustable feel. Al-
though this area could be developed further, it doesn't appear necessary.
Another peculiarity of this most simple fly-by-wire hand controller is the aero trim function.
In a conventional mechanical system, the stick force can be trimmed without moving the stick. In the
Orbiter, the manual trim signal goes into the control loop. This causes the vehicle to respond un-
less one backs off on the controller as the trim is applied. In general, this cannot be done perfect-
ly but there have been no complaints. This is probably because the manual trim is hardly ever used
since automatic trim follow-up is available. It would complicate the controller greatly to make the
trim function appear conventional.
Controller location was also of some concern. It is in the center (not side stick) and canted
some 19 degrees left to be comfortable for right-hand use. It provides better access and room for
displays and switches. However, there was concern about the possibility of control cross-coupling
since it is not aligned mechanically with the vehicle axes. To keep it in the center and aligned
with vehicle axes would make it misaligned with natural arm motion. Either way some cross-coupling
is likely. It does occur at times but not to a large degree and apparently has not been objection-
able.
In the Orbiter, the hand controller is only connected to some electrical transducers and feel
springs. It is easy to move the controller faster than the surface can respond without knowing it.
When this happens in one control axis, a small input in the other axis will be ignored in an elevon
system unless some special limiting is provided in the software. We did not have this limiting ini-
tially because it did not appear that the problem ever arose during simulations. During the last
approach and landing test (ALT) flight however the situation occurred. Small lateral inputs were
ignored until the pilot put in a big one provoking a lateral PIO when the vehicle suddenly responded.
We subsequently added a series of limiters in the aileron/elevator/elevon mixer logic. This insured
that control in one axis was never completely locked out due to rate saturation in the other.
This resulted in getting by with a very simple and light-weight hand controller configuration
relative to what it might have been.
THE "WHEELIE"
The wheelie that occurred on STS-3 was a bonafide handling qualities problem even though it
occurred after main gear touchdown. The external symptom was the unintended pitch up during rollout
after the nose had started down. The problem is caused by the change in geometry that takes place
when the vehicle touches down. The center of rotation shifts from the center of gravity to the main
gear. This aft shift in the center of rotation, coupled with a vehicle that is already statically un-
stable, results in a rapidly increasing nose down moment as the nose is lowered. The control system
configured for the inflight situation could not keep up with the rapidly changing elevator trim re-
quirement. Nor could it provide a stable pitch rate control loop. This was recognized analytically
early in the program. However there was a reluctance to accept the required switching of control sys-
tem parameters at touchdown that is necessary to compensate for the change in geometry. Instead, the
pilots demonstrated during simulations that they could handle the problem. The procedure was to hold
the nose up at the touchdown attitude until the speed decreased to an acceptable value. Then the
nose gear is let down. Pitching over can cause full-up elevator and if started at too high an air-
speed can result in excessive gear loads. Once the nose starts down, the trim changes so fast that
is is almost impossible to stop it without overcontrolling. That's what happened on STS-3. It was
not too difficult for the lightweight ALT Orbiter. However, at today's heavier landing weight and es-
pecially combined with a forward center of gravity, the control task is considered unacceptable.
The problem was reevaluated on a fixed base simulator and several fixes were developed. They
involved changing the flight control system for landing or switching parameters at touchdown. Fortu-
nately, this problem was quite obvious on the simulator and it was also quite noticeable when an im-
provement was made. The simulator evaluation included a sequence where the nose was lowered then
raised again to evaluate controllability under the worst weight and center of gravity conditions. We
ended up choosing the fix that was simplest to implement. This consisted of switching the pitch axis
hand controller output through the same signal path that the autoland system uses. It switches param-
eters at touchdown. Most of the software was already there.
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LANDING FLIGHT CONTROL
The Orbiter pitch axis control during landing has undoubtedly been the single most worrisome
handling qualities problem. The symptoms are that if the pilot attempts to take very aggressive con-
trol of the vehicle close to the ground and force it to land at a specific point, there is a tendency
to get into a pilot-induced oscillation. As a result, the pilots have learned to get the approach
well set up early from an energy standpoint and take unusual care to avoid large inputs close to the
ground. Gusts and crosswinds could aggravate this technique, hence, the concern.
The attitude control response has been consistently reported as crisp. Consequently there is
something deficient in the path control; i.e., the control of altitude rate or normal acceleration.
This always leads back to the same dilemma. It is obvious that the normal acceleration (Nz) response
is sluggish. To quicken it significantly requires more overshoot in the pitch rate response and the
pilots always object to that. Notice that the choice of feedback parameters (6 or Nz) is not neces-
sarily a significant issue here. The response to command can be made the same with either feedback
depending on how it is shaped. But either way, to get faster Nz response means more pitch rate over-
shoot. Actually, pitch rate was selected as the specified response parameter. It was well behaved
with no initial reversals or dependence on sensor location as is the case for Nz. This does not
inherently limit any type of control system configuration but just judges them based on the pitch
rate response. Other considerations for choice of feedback parameter in the actual system are based
on the response to external disturbance. For a vehicle, such as the Orbiter, with zero or slightly
negative static stability, pitch rate appears the safer choice. It is less demanding on surface rate
in gusts and turbulence. To rate limit under these conditions could mean loss of control.
More analytical treatments in references 3 and 4 have pointed out that the existing pitch rate
control system mechanization cancels the inherent zeros in the bare airframe pitch rate transfer func-
tion and replaces them with another term that does not completely cancel the corresponding term in
the flight path response like a conventional unaugmented airframe. Figure 1 illustrates this. The
result shown in figure 2 is an unnatural attentuation. There is also an additional phase lag in the
flight path response relative to what it would be with perfect cancelation. There are, in general,
two ways to correct this. One is to reshape the pitch rate control system to preserve the bare
airframe short period zero as in reference 4. The other way is to add a lead/lag filter in the hand
controller output. It is tuned to cancel the existing system zero and replace it with the natural
airframe value. Since this is done outside the control loop, it does not change the stability mar-
gins of the inner control loop. It only changes the handling qualities as seen by the pilot.
A recent series of fixed base sinulator evaluations examined these and other variations in the
pitch axis control during landing. This was done to determine if improvement is possible by changes
to the software. These simulations are still in progress. A complete treatment is beyond the scope
of this paper but some of the findings have been the following:
1. None of the changes made more than a 0.5 improvement in the Cooper-Harper rating or a 26 per-
cent improvement in landing performance with respect to the existing baseline system. Twice that much
would be required to consider a change.
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2. The systems with the best landing performance were not rated the best by the pilots. In
fact, the two systems with the best landing performances were both rated worse than the baseline.
3. The lead/lag stick filter addition to the baseline was one of the two best systems from a
performance standpoint (group 1 out of 8) even though not properly implemented in detail.
4. The baseline system was in group 3 out of 8 from a performance standpoint. It was rated in
group 2 out of 5 (C.H. = 3.5) by the pilots which is quite consistent.
These systems did not all have the same inner loop gain or gain margin. Consequently it is not
immediately obvious what aspect of a given system caused a certain result. Also, from the pilots'
comments, it is clear that there are many subtleties that affect the rating of a system. These
subtleties include having to control across the hand controller detent or use push force right at
touchdown. It is also clear that the pilots' first priority is attitude response. Systems with sig-
nificant overshoot tended to be downgraded even though they might have better flight path response.
This probably resulted from training and adjustment to accommodate the existing system. Changing the
system response characterstics to achieve better landing performance would probably require a signifi-
cant amount of retraining. The improvement needs to be significant enough to warrant the effort.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEXT TIME
It is interesting to consider what should be done from a handling qualities standpoint if a sec-
ond-generation Shuttle were to be designed. There are at least two major objectives to address.
First, there should be an effort to provide more definitive requirements for mission phases other
than approach and landing. A significant amount of basic knowledge is available that would be use-
ful. However, it needs to be organized and written down. The effort would probably expose holes
where further activity would be beneficial. Future missions will serve to increase the understanding
of these requirements and allow a more knowledgeable compromise with new vehicle configurations if
available at the outset.
The other major objective should be to improve the pitch axis handling qualities for landing.
First, serious consideration should be given to arrange the vehicle configuration such that fast-
acting direct lift control is available for landing. This could be by means of canard control sur-
faces or wing flaps if it is a tail-controlled vehicle. Possibly even the reaction control system
could be used if it were designed with this in mind. Secondly, there needs to be a strong influence
at the beginning of the program to keep the flight control system time delays to a minimum. Addi-
tional time delays tend to creep in and this is clearly detrimental though somewhat difficult to
quantify. Specific requirements should be imposed for end-to-end system response delays. In addi-
tion, the design and development effort must be monitored closely. Aggressive action should be taken
where necessary to ascertain that proper attention is given to meeting the requirements. The inner
flight control loops should be processed at 50 cycles/second or more for landing. The redundant ac-
tuator design should be reviewed to quantify and determine ways to minimize'the response delays to
small signals. Finally, a hardware feed forward provision should be implemented so that small ampli-
tude, high passed analog signals can be sent directly to the actuators from the hand controller or
sensor summing junction to bypass the digital delays and overcome the small amplitude actuator non-
linearities. These improvements are relatively easy during the design process but nearly impossible
to change after the hardware is built.
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